



INSPECTORATE OF GOVERNMENT

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COST AND EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN RECRUITMENT BY THE DISTRICT SERVICE COMMISSIONS IN UGANDA

DECEMBER 2024

A just and corruption free Uganda

Foreword



Corruption in recruitment of public officers by District Service Commissions (DSCs) is an endemic and rampant problem in Uganda. The corruption allegations in recruitment include; forgery, bribery, political interference, utterance of false documents, favoritism and nepotism etc.

These practices undermine the quality of employees hired, compromises public service delivery and often lead to significant financial losses to both government and job seekers. Indeed the poor quality goods and services prevalent in almost all aspects of Government works are presumed to be the results of corruption.

It is for these reasons that Inspectorate of Government (IG) commissioned a study to assess the cost and extent of corruption in recruitment of public officers by District Service Commission. The research was conducted in collaboration with Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) Makerere University.

This study was fully financed with the IG budget for Financial Year 2024/2025. I express my sincere appreciation to all respondents from Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Local Governments who provided information that enabled compilation of the report.

Our gratitude too, goes to the team from Economic Policy Research Centre for conducting the study. I appreciate the efforts of the IG Technical Committee in planning, coordinating and ensuring that the study was completed.

As we issue the report, it is my prayer that relevant Authorities and Institutions in Government will use the findings to have further deliberations to put in place strategies that will inform policy formulation to deter, prevent and eliminate corruption in the recruitment processes in the Local Governments.

Beti Kamya Turwomwe

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT

Overview of Statistics

Uganda loses

UGX.9.144tn

to Corruption Annually
(IG Report 2021)

Extrapolating the **bribes paid**
to the **146 Districts** annually
translates to

UGX.42.34bn

Bribes asked for senior positions
like Heads of Department range
from **UGX40 million** to

UGX.50m

Bribes asked for lower positions
for U6 and U7 jobs such as
Nursing Assistants and Grade III
Primary Teacher is

UGX.3m

Job applicants in the Education
sector reported the highest
amount of bribe requests at

UGX.36.9bn

Job applicants in the
Health sector reported

UGX.14bn

as amount of bribe asked.

Job applicants in the Health Sector
reported the highest amount
of actual bribes paid

UGX.12.9bn

Total value of Bribes

paid to public officials
annually was

UGX.166bn

(UBOS Survey, 2017)

82%

of **job applicants identified**
bribery as the most common
form of corruption in
recruitment processes.

UGX.78bn

Bribes asked from job
applicants in LGs for the period
2018 to 2022

UGX.29bn

Bribes actually paid by job
applicants in LGs for the
period 2018 to 2022

UGX.5.8bn

Bribes actually paid by job
applicants in the 20 sampled
districts annually

UGX.290m

Bribes paid by job applicants
per district annually

44%

DSCs were not fully
constituted.

Executive summary

The Inspectorate of Government (IG) in collaboration with Economic Policy Research Centre Makerere University conducted a study on the cost and extent of corruption in recruitment of Public Officers by District Service Commissions in Uganda.

Corruption within the District Service Commissions (DSCs) poses significant threats to the integrity, efficiency, and fairness in Local Government (LG) recruitment processes. This not only compromises the quality of employees hired and service delivery, but also erodes public trust in Government institutions.

The study established the following key findings;

1. Eighty two percent (82%) of job applicants identified bribery as the most common form of corruption in recruitment processes.
2. Job applicants at Local Government were asked bribes of up to UGX78 billion, but the actual bribes paid amounted to approximately UGX29 billion for the period 2018 to 2022. This implied that UGX.5.8 billion was paid in bribes in the 20 sampled districts annually, translating into a payment of UGX.290 million per district every year. Extrapolating the bribes actually paid to the 146 Districts annually translates to UGX42.34 billion.
3. The bribes asked for vary widely by sector, position, and seniority, ranging from UGX 40-50 million for senior roles like Heads of Department to UGX 3 million for lower positions for salary scale U6 and U7 for jobs such as Nursing Assistants and Grade III Primary Teachers.
4. The Education sector had the highest bribe requests at UGX 36.9 billion, while the Health Sector reported the highest actual bribe payments, totaling UGX 12.9 billion.
5. Most DSCs followed the recruitment process to a greater extent. However, there were irregularities and malpractices related to forgery of minutes, academic documents, impersonation, sneaking in people who did not apply for appointment, fake advertisements, localization of jobs, partial recruitment and advertisements.
6. Job applicants are most likely to pay bribes at the shortlisting stage and DSCs members are the most likely to ask for a bribe.
7. Bribery by applicants and solicitation of bribes by recruiters/Commissions appear to be the main determinants of who gets hired, while nepotism, favoritism and political connections/patronage play a minor role in recruitment. Corruption in the recruitment cycle is widespread at the shortlist and interview stages.
8. Political interference and influence peddling in the appointment of the District Service Commission Members are prevalent, compromising the integrity and independence of the Commissions. This is further compounded by inadequate

funding of the Commissions, low and untimely remuneration of the Commission members, which undermines the operation of the planned activities.

9. Bribes are mostly asked from applicants seeking positions in the health and administration sectors.
10. Most (44%) of the DSCs were not fully constituted which affected their operations.

The study identified various situations that facilitate corruption in recruitment by DSCs. These include:

- i. High rate of unemployment
- ii. Nature of appointment of the DSC Members
- iii. Political interference/patronage
- iv. Inadequate funding and financial resources for DSC.
- v. Lack of transparency in recruitment
- vi. Weak oversight and accountability by Public Service Commission
- vii. Nepotism and favoritism
- viii. Inadequate training and professional development of DSC Members
- ix. Direct contact with applicants through telephone calls
- x. Manual-based recruitment processes
- xi. Jobs with higher salaries (Scientists) are more susceptible to bribe demands.

These findings underscore the need for comprehensive policy reforms in Local Government recruitment procedures to enhance transparency, accountability and efficiency.

The study recommends among others; Change in the appointment procedure/processes for the District Service Commission Officials; Change in the composition of the District Service Commissions; Review and raise the minimum qualifications and experience of the members of the District Service Commissions; Provision of adequate funds for operations of District Service Commission and enhancement of remuneration of the Commission members and Government should expedite the implementation of the Human Capital Management and e-recruitment systems at Local Governments to minimize physical contact between applicants and Local Government personnel.

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List of Acronyms

CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CCI	Control of Corruption Index
CHW	Community Health Worker
DAO	District Agricultural Officer
DEC	District Executive Committee
DEO	District Education Officer
DHO	District Health Officer
DISO	District Internal Security Officer
DPHRO	District Principal Human Resource Officer
DSC	District Service Commission
EA	Enumeration Area
GoU	Government of Uganda
HRO	Human Resource Officer
IG	Inspectorate of Government
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LC	Local Council
LG	Local Government
MoPS	Ministry of Public Service
NISIV	National Integrity Survey
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PHRO	Principal Human Resource Officer
PSC	Public Service Commission
PSU	Primary Sampling Unit
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
SHACU	State House Anti-Corruption Unit
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UN	United Nations

1.0 Introduction

Corruption is a prevalent, persistent and a syndicated problem in many developing countries. In Uganda, the rising incidences of corruption have attracted significant public attention in the media, among citizens and development partners. For instance, the report on prevalence of corruption in Uganda by the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (2023), indicates that 33.5 % of Ugandans reported the existence of corruption both at district and central government level, with the central region having the highest incidence compared to other regions.

Uganda's unemployment situation and the reliance on government jobs, especially within the districts, have expanded the opportunities for corruption by the District Service Commission (DSC) in public sector recruitment. Indeed, the 2019 National Integrity Survey Report indicated that, 45% of Ugandans acknowledge the existence of corruption and maladministration in Local Governments (LGs) especially at the DSCs. The same report further indicates that 90% of Ugandans pay unofficial fees to the DSCs while seeking services. The study further revealed that 50% of Ugandans believe the DSCs are dishonest in executing their mandate. In addition, 38% of Ugandans believe that DSCs irregularly recruit government employees in LG. The principal causes of corruption include poor supervision and monitoring of workers, low and delayed salaries, lack of stringent punishment, greed, among others.

The expectation is for members of the DSCs to be independent in the execution of their duties. However, there are public concerns regarding the lack of independence of the DSC because of interference from their appointing authorities, especially the District Chairpersons and Councilors. Lack of transparency in the LG hiring process undermines meritocracy and the quality of a country's public sector workforce, which is a fundamental determinant of state capability, administrative performance and plays an important role in improving service delivery.

Corruption is costly to the Ugandan economy. In 2021, the IG reported that corruption costs the country UGX 9.144 trillion annually (IG, 2021)¹. The National Governance Baseline Survey estimated that the total value of bribes paid to public officials was UGX 166 billion annually (UBOS, 2017). The report on prevalence of corruption in Uganda by the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (2023) also indicates that corruption may take different forms such as, bribery, embezzlement, favouritism and nepotism, among others. Notably, at the sectoral level, corruption goes beyond what meets the public eye. For instance, in the education sector, cases of teacher absenteeism, ghost teachers and students have been very common over the recent past.²

1 IG, 2021. The cost of corruption in Uganda. https://www.igg.go.ug/media/files/publications/Cost_of_Corruption_Popular_Version.pdf

2 IG, 2021. The cost of corruption in the education sector. https://www.igg.go.ug/media/files/publications/The_cost_

Most importantly, corruption has been extensively documented in LG recruitment processes. This has been in the form of bribery by applicants, solicitation for bribes by LG officials, favouritism, and patronage, among others. This implies that the DSC is unlikely to hire or retain good quality employees. As such, corruption has resulted in the recruitment of unqualified and incompetent individuals into public offices, costing the country not only quality service delivery, but also public funds, which are paid to unqualified personnel with little or no returns which affects service delivery.

There are also rising cases of reported corruption against DSCs regarding local government recruitment. Between 2019 to December 2022, the number of complaints of corruption-related cases in recruitment against DSCs to the IG surged from 202 to 637 (IG, Database, 2024).³ Specifically, Teachers and Healthcare workers demonstrate a willingness to pay bribes to secure employment, secure transfers to desirable locations, or prevent being relocated to remote areas. Furthermore, cases of influence peddling, political interference and patronage have been common in the recruitment processes of the education sector. This poses dire consequences to the country as it lowers the quality of teaching, human capital, and health services offered as workers are hired based on reasons other than merit.⁴ However, these incidences are not peculiar to Uganda. Findings of corruption in recruitment have been well documented in several studies and countries⁵.

Against the above background, this study examines and assesses the extent and cost of corruption and maladministration at the different stages in the recruitment process by the DSCs in Uganda. Specifically, this study aims to; establish the level and extent of corruption and its associated costs exhibited by the DSCs, highlighting the maladministration that contributed to the level of corruption; examine the practices and procedures regarding recruitment in order to identify situations that facilitate corruption and maladministration; examine the shortcomings for the effective operations of DSCs; and make appropriate policy recommendations for effective recruitments in LGs.

The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section Two provides the review of the literature on the drivers and impacts of non-merit-based recruitment of public servants. Section three details the methods used in the assessment, including the survey of public service job applicants at the LG level. Section four provides the results of the assessment while section five provides the recommendations.

and_extent_of_corruption_in_the_Education_Sector_in_Uganda_2_8pMy4nd.pdf

3 IG, Database on reported cases of corruption against DSC and district administration

4 https://www.igg.go.ug/media/files/publications/The_cost_and_extent_of_corruption_in_the_Education_Sector_in_Uganda_2_8pMy4nd.pdf

5 For a detailed overview refer to (Colonnelli et al., 2020; Fafchamps and Labonne, 2017; Dal Bó et al., 2013; Finan et al., 2017; Weaver, 2021; Kristiansen and Ramli 2006).

2.0 Review of related literature

Corruption in public sector recruitment is a pervasive problem worldwide. It is widely recognised that, corruption in civil service hiring, manifests itself in the form of practices such as nepotism, bribery, and patronage, diminishes bureaucratic efficiency, compromises the quality of the public sector workforce, and adversely affects service delivery which undermines the effectiveness of governance (Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso, 2017; Oliveros and Schuster, 2018). Non-meritocratic recruitment, where hiring decisions are influenced by political connections, inducements or favoritism, lead to a less competent and less accountable public sector, ultimately stifling economic growth and limiting poverty reduction efforts (Pellegrino and Zingales, 2017).

Globally, numerous studies have demonstrated the detrimental effects of corruption in public sector hiring. For instance, in Brazil, political patronage has been identified as a key determinant in public sector appointments, resulting in the recruitment of less qualified individuals, which in turn reduces public sector performance (Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso, 2020). In Kenya, public sector hiring based on favouritism and close contacts within LGs have been linked to inefficiencies and compromised service delivery (Hassan et al., 2023). Similarly, in the U.S., discretionary appointments continue to be a common practice in the allocation of federal positions, with significant implications for governance and administrative integrity (Bertrand, 2009).

The adverse impacts of corruption extend beyond individual appointments to broader systemic issues within public administrations. For example, in China, patron networks among LG officials have been shown to influence economic performance, with both positive and negative outcomes, depending on the nature of connections (Jiang, 2018). Meanwhile, in several African countries, corruption in public sector recruitment often involves bribery, where hiring decisions are made based on monetary inducements rather than qualifications or merit, leading to widespread inefficiencies and public dissatisfaction with government services (Rose-Ackerman, 1998).

In Uganda, corruption in LG recruitment by the DSCs is a significant challenge that mirrors these global issues. The recruitment of public sector workers is often marred by political patronage, bribery, and other forms of corruption, which undermine the quality of the civil service and the delivery of public services. Political interference in the recruitment process, where jobs are used to reward political supporters, has been particularly problematic, leading to the appointment of unqualified or unsuitable candidates who lack the necessary skills and competencies (Kirya, 2020).

The extent of corruption in Uganda's DSCs is further exacerbated by maladministration practices such as the manipulation of recruitment procedures, favouritism in hiring decisions, and the acceptance of bribes in exchange for job placements (Mwesigwa, 2021; Nabaho, and Kiiza, 2013). These corrupt practices distort the allocation of public sector jobs, discourage qualified individuals from seeking public sector employment, and contribute to a public service that is not only inefficient but also riddled with integrity issues. The impact is particularly severe in critical sectors like health and education, where the appointment of incompetent staff directly affects service delivery and undermines public trust in government institutions.

Despite the importance of meritocratic recruitment in containing corruption and improving service delivery (Charron, et al., 2017), there are important obstacles that limit the quality of employees hired in public sector recruitment process, especially in developing countries' DSCs, which undermines the quality of public sector workforce, service delivery and public trust (Weaver, 2021; Colonnelli, Prem and Teso, 2020; Finan, et al., 2017; Teclemichael, Tessema & Soeters, 2006). For instance, political patronage (the use of public sector jobs by politicians to reward their political supporters), has been identified as a common practice (Colonnelli, Prem, & Teso, 2020; Grindle, 2012).

2.1 The recruitment process at District Service Commissions

The recruitment process at the DSCs starts with the Heads of Department, who undertake a needs assessment and submit vacancy details to the CAO, who formally declares these vacancies and instructs the DSC to commence recruitment as shown in Figure 1. During this stage, there is a tendency for members to hoard jobs by keeping for relatives, advertising in bits and altering job specifications to suit their candidates who may not be qualified.

Every year, a minimum of 46 retire, including teachers, primary teachers, and health workers, and some staff. Last financial year, 46 workers retired or left the district. The law is that we are supposed to replace them. The Commission was working, but the CAO simply refused to send the names of the vacant positions to the Commission..... Then when he sent the letters to declare the vacant positions, 16 positions were left. Can you imagine? (KII respondent, 2024)

The DSC then advertises the vacancies through local newspapers, notice boards, and online platforms to attract potential candidates, setting the stage for a transparent and equitable recruitment process.


The second stage is application and shortlisting. Upon receiving applications, the DSC initiates a review to shortlist candidates who meet the specified minimum qualifications and experience. This screening phase aims to ensure efficiency by advancing only eligible candidates to subsequent assessment stages.

The third stage entails conducting interviews and assessments of applicants. Shortlisted candidates undergo comprehensive evaluations, which may include written tests, oral interviews, or practical demonstrations. These assessment evaluates candidates' competencies, problem-solving abilities, and suitability for the position, ensuring a rigorous selection process.

The fourth stage involves selection and appointment. Based on a holistic assessment of merit, including academic credentials, professional experience, and performance in assessments, the DSC selects the most qualified candidate. The selection emphasizes alignment with organizational values and objectives, highlighting the DSC’s commitment to appointing candidates who can positively contribute to district operations.

The fifth stage is the formal appointment process of the successful candidate. The CAO oversees the appointment phase, extending formal offers contingent upon verification of qualifications and satisfactory background checks. Upon confirmation, the selected candidate receives an appointment notification and proceeds to sign a contract or agreement detailing terms of service, responsibilities, and entitlements. This contractual agreement formalizes the employment relationship and establishes mutual expectations between the appointee and the district administration. Finally, the successful applicant is deployed.

Figure 1: Recruitment stages and nature of bribes asked at each stage



2.2 Decentralisation and operations of District Service Commissions

In recent decades, many developing countries have witnessed a wave of devolution of power to LGs (Grossman and Lewis 2014). Advocates of decentralisation argue that it brings government services closer to their constituencies, leads to better public service delivery, allows policies to closely reflect local preferences, and facilitates monitoring, accountability and local economic development (Besley and Case 1995). However, critics of decentralisation argue that it is vulnerable to local capture by local elites and special interests of politicians (Boffa et al., 2016; Dutta, 2009; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).

The decentralisation policy in Uganda was launched in 1992 with 13 pilot districts (Kakumba, 2008). Following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, the decentralisation policy was rolled out to the entire country. The DSC was established under Article 198(1) of the Constitution and Section 54(1) of the Local Governments Act, CAP 243, and under Section 54(2) of the same Act as a devolved function. The DSC performs a decentralised or devolved role of the PSC which was established under 1995 Constitution (Public Service Commission, 2020). DSCs are by law required to conform to standards established by the PSC.

Article 166(1) [d] of the Constitution and Section 58 of the Local Government Act (Cap 243) (GoU, 1997:5343) insulates the DSC from any external influence by clearly stating that, “The District Service Commission shall be independent and shall not be subject to control or direction of any person or authority”.

Sections 56(1) [a]-[d] of the same Act further spells out the minimum qualifications for a member of the DSC: being ordinarily a resident of the district; being a person of high moral character and proven integrity; possessing a minimum of ten years working experience in a responsible position; and being in possession of a diploma qualification. It should be noted that it is upon the above minimum criteria that the PSC approves members of the DSCs.

The Chairpersons and members of the DSC are nominated by the District Executive Committee (DEC), approved by the PSC and appointed by the district Council as stipulated under Article 198(2) of the Constitution. The members of the DSC hold office for a period of four years and are eligible for appointment for one more term. The PSC further guides and coordinates the work of the DSC as provided under Article 166(1) of the Constitution and in addition, it hears and determines grievances from persons appointed by the DSCs, among others.

The DSC is responsible for the hire, appointment, promotion, disciplining and removal from office of all employees of district LGs, other than the CAO and Deputy CAO. The same applies to cities and municipalities, apart from the post of Town Clerk and Deputy Town Clerk, where that responsibility is entrusted to the central government (PSC). The right of DSCs to hire, fire and oversee district staff is anchored in the 1995 Constitution and further consolidated in the Local Government Act (1997).

Since 2006, Uganda has witnessed a move towards recentralization of some LG personnel administration (Nabaho, 2013). For instance, the power to hire and fire CAOs of districts, their deputies; and Town Clerks of municipalities were shifted from DSCs to the central government’s PSC. The goal of recentralizing the recruitment of these high-level administrators was to improve accountability and enhance the performance of LGs (Manyak and Katono, 2010).

3.0 Methodology and data

To achieve the study objectives, a mixed methods approach was applied that combined both qualitative and quantitative techniques.

3.1 Quantitative approach

3.1.1 Sample size

The study randomly sampled 20 districts from the four (4) regions of Uganda, with 5 districts from each region. At this stage information was sought on the potential number of applicants per selected district as well as the departments to sample from. The sample probability of selected applicants was also computed. The size required for the sample was determined by taking into consideration several factors, the five most important being: the degree of precision (reliability) desired for the survey estimates, the cost and operational limitations, department/sector applied in and category of application status (applied but not shortlisted, shortlisted but not appointed; and shortlisted and appointed). To avoid incidences of over and under sampling, unequal units were selected based on many parameters including the number of applicants in a particular district to ensure sample size appropriateness and representativeness. A total of 748 applicants were sampled from the selected 20 districts.

Table 1: Sampled districts

Region	District	No. of respondents
Northern	Apac, Agago, Omoro, Moyo and Arua	165 (22.1%)
Eastern	Serere, Budaka, Abim, Busia and Kaliro	225 (30.1%)
Central	Kayunga, Nakasongola, Mubende, Wakiso and Masaka	191 (25.5%)
Western	Kabale, Sheema, Ntungamo, Kakumiro and Ntoroko	167 (22.3%)
Total		748

Source: EPRC-IG 2024 Survey

3.1.2 Sampling frame

The list of applicants obtained from the DSC from 2018 to 2022 was used as a sampling frame. Given the list of applicants, it was estimated that 660,401 persons applied for jobs in the DSCs, details of the sampling frame are shown below.

Table 2: Number of applicants by sector and region

	Education	Administration	Health	Agriculture	Community	Others	Total
Central	36,348	364,402	120,648	15,751	3,211	29,051	569,413
Eastern	8,972	10,909	2,662	2,847	6,721	2,795	34,906
Northern	3,453	4,990	1,298	1,038	964	41	11,784
Western	14,503	8,396	8,051	5,184	1,636	6,529	44,299
Total	63,276	388,698	132,60	24,820	12,533	38,416	660,401

Source: EPRC-IG 2024 Survey

3.1.3 Computing the actual cost of corruption

To estimate the actual cost of corruption in DSCs recruitment, the study used a sample of 20 selected districts. For the sample estimates to be nationally representative, sampling weights were attached to each applicant based on probability of selection. The weight for each sampled applicant was computed as the inverse of probability of selection, multiplied by the probabilities at each selection stage. An applicant weight was attached to each sampled applicant record in the data.

At the enumeration area (EA) level, the weights were computed separately for each district. Based on the stratified two-stage sample design, the probability of selection for the sample applicant within a sample EA can be expressed as follows:

$$P_{hi} = \frac{n_h \times M_{hi}}{M_h} \times \frac{m_{hi}}{M'_{hi}}$$

Where:

P_{hi} is the probability of selecting the sample applicants in the i^{th} sample of the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in the district h

n_h is the number of sample PSUs selected in district h for the survey

M_{hi} is the total number of applicants in the frame for the i^{th} sample PSU in district h

M_h is the total number of applicants in the sampling frame for district h

m_{hi} is the number of sample applicants selected in the i^{th} sample PSU in district h

M'_{hi} is the total number of applicants with listed in the i^{th} sample PSU in district h

The basic sampling weights are calculated as the inverse of these probabilities of selection. The weights for the sample applicants were calculated as follows:

$$W_{hi} = \frac{M_h \times M'_{hi}}{n_h \times M_{hi} \times m_{hi}}$$

Where:

W_{hi} is the basic weight for the sample applicants in the i^{th} sample PSU of district h

3.2 Qualitative approach

To complement the quantitative approach, KIIs were conducted and administered to a select set of respondents. The KIIs were administered to 5 selected district officials purposively drawn from each of the 20 selected districts, across the four regions of Uganda. These key informants were selected because they are the officials who come in direct or indirect contact with applicants in the recruitment process.

Table 3: Sampled KIIs by region

	LCV	CAO	RDC	DEO	DHO	DSC Chair	DPHRO	DSC Member	Total
Northern	4	5	3	2	1	3	4	3	25
Eastern	5	3	2	1	1	5	8	-	25
Central	3	5	-	5	-	5	6	1	25
Western	1	5	4	5	4	2	4	-	25
Total	13	18	9	13	6	15	22	4	100

Source: EPRC-IG 2024 Survey

In addition to the KIIs with the district officials, KIIs with Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Public Service and Chairperson of the Public Service Commission, were conducted to validate and complement the findings.

3.3 Data and data sources

The study relied on both primary and secondary data.

3.3.1 Secondary data

- i. IG database of reported complaints to IG regarding recruitment challenges at the LGs (FY 2018/19 -2022/23).
- ii. DSCs; list of applicants, recruitment manual, minutes, job adverts, shortlists, transfers, appointments and promotions documentation.

3.3.2 Primary data

- iii. Primary data was collected using a quantitative survey of applicants who interfaced with DSCs and their experiences of corruption, if any. The quantitative survey targeted the following: Teachers, Health workers and district staff recruited under the DSCs (given that this represents the largest category of LG staff).
- iv. Qualitative survey of district officials and review of relevant documents.

3.4 Relevant documents

For each of the selected DSCs, a detailed review of relevant documents was performed to ascertain whether due processes were followed during recruitment. The team reviewed reports and documents related to practices, procedures, and operations of DSCs during recruitment processes in order to identify any situations or environments that facilitate corruption. The specific documents related to job advertisements, job requirements and qualifications, shortlists of candidates, minutes authorizing appointments, transfers, promotions, among other documents, were reviewed.

Other documents reviewed included;

- i. Reports by PSC regarding the functionality of DSC activities from 2018-2022
- ii. Reported cases/complaints against DSCs to IG regarding corruption in recruitment at the LG (FY 2018/19 -2022/23) from the IG database
- iii. Reports on the composition of DSCs by the PSC in 20 selected DSCs from 2018/19 to 2022
- iv. Records of the operations of DSCs in 20 selected districts, annual work plans, budgets and recruitment plans from 2018 to 2022
- v. Newspaper articles on the perceptions and attitudes on corruption in DSC recruitment from 2018 to 2022
- vi. OPM reports on Assessment of Performance of LGs
- vii. Inspection reports by MoPS and LGs from 2018 to 2022

The study established that most (44%) of the DSCs were not fully constituted which affected their operations. This is shown in Table 4.

Due to lack of constitution of the Commission as required by the Law, we have not been able to recruit/hire for three years now. This has affected service delivery and operations of the Commission. (KII Respondent, 2024)

Table 4: Number of documents reviewed by region (%)

Documents reviewed	Region				
	Central	Eastern	Northern	Western	Uganda
Approved structure/establishment	100	100	100	100	100
District annual work plan/budgets	80	75	50	100	81
Approval to recruit by Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Finance	80	100	50	100	88
Approved recruitment plans and budgets for recruitment by DSC	75	100	100	100	93
Approved job advertisement	80	100	100	100	94
Copies of all job advertisement in the print media	80	75	100	100	88
Reports of all candidates shortlisted for interviews and those not shortlisted	80	100	100	100	94
Records of attendance to interviews	80	100	100	100	94
Reports of candidates who were interviewed	80	100	100	100	94
Minutes authorizing appointments by DSCs	80	100	100	100	94
Vetting reports for successful candidates	40	75	100	100	75
Copies of appointment letters issued by CAOs	80	100	50	100	88
Records of staff/human resource deployment, transfers and promotions	80	75	100	100	88
Annual DSC Reports to Public Service Commission	80	100	100	100	94
Reports of the operations of the DSC and whether they are fully constituted	80	25	50	60	56

Source: EPRC-IG 2024 Survey

3.5 Technical committee

The Technical Committee was comprised of eight members from the IG who included Penywii James (Overall Coordinator), Mwebesa Peter, Pinyewa Joseph Vicky, Mwembe Annet, Kabbale John Bosco, Ojok Michael, Lule Geoffrey and Kayondo Adam Lincoln. The overall objective of the Technical Committee was to coordinate, monitor and supervise the Consultant to be able to achieve quality work and ensure results are reliable and meet research standards. The specific roles of the Technical Committee were to;

- Formulate the terms of reference for the study
- Prepare and design the survey instruments in collaboration with EPRC
- Organize stakeholder meetings
- Coordinate and supervise data collection activities to ensure quality control
- Submit inception, progress and final reports to the IG

4.0 Extent and level of corruption and its associated costs

This section presents information on the incidences, extent and cost of corruption in recruitment processes by DSC. It also identifies the common forms of corruption, situations that facilitate corruption and gaps in the recruitment process.

Table 5 below provides an overview of the characteristics of respondents disaggregated by gender, sector and region. As indicated in Table 5 below, a total of 748 respondents were interviewed. This comprised of 290 females and 458 males. By sector, a total of 108 applicants in the education; 178 in administration; 175 in health; 116 in agriculture; 67 in community and 104 other district personnel were interviewed.

Table 5: Number of respondents surveyed per region by sector

Sector	Region				
	Central	Eastern	Northern	Western	Total
Education	40	29	22	17	108
Administration	38	53	68	19	178
Health	36	76	44	19	175
Agriculture	44	24	20	28	116
Community	32	22	5	8	67
Other	1	21	6	76	104
By Gender					
Female	83	88	72	47	290
Male	108	137	93	120	458
Total	191	225	165	167	748

Source: EPRC-IG 2024 Survey

Table 6 presents findings of the average amount of bribes paid per person per sector and the range of values. Notably, applicants in the health sector reported to have paid the highest amount of bribe on average of UGX 3,000,000 over a range of UGX 500,000 to UGX 12,000,000. Applicants in the education sector reported to have paid the lowest amount of bribe averaging UGX 1,000,000 ranging from UGX 500,000 to UGX 1,500,000. Generally applicants reported paying at least UGX 500,000 to get a job.


Table 6: Range and average of actual amounts of bribes paid per person per sector

Sector	Minimum	Maximum	Average
Education	500,000	1,500,000	1,000,000
Health	500,000	12,000,000	3,000,000
Agriculture	500,000	7,000,000	2,800,000
Community	550,000	5,000,000	2,500,000
Administrative	500,000	10,000,000	2,600,000
Others	500,000	5,000,000	2,400,000

4.1 Overview of Reported Incidences of Corruption

Regarding the corruption incidences, findings reveal that there has been a steady increase in the number of reported cases of corruption against district officials and DSC to the IG. Cases, as per the IG database, increased on average from 202 annually in 2019/20 to 637 in 2022/23. This partly explains why The President of Uganda, on 26th January, 2023, during the NRM Liberation Day celebrations in Kakumiro castigated the DSCs for “selling” local government jobs to people.

Figure 2: Average number of reported cases of corruption




Source: IG database

4.2 Contact with district officials

Figure 3 reveals that 30.3% of the respondents had contacted the CAO, 26.8% had contact with the support staff, and 22.5% had contact with the HRO. The same chart also reveals that almost half (48.3%) of the respondents reported seeking information as the main reason for interacting with these officers. This explains why majority interacted with the CAO, to seek information given his role as the administrative head, and thus involved in all activities at the district, as the districts' Accounting Officer. For the HROs and support staff, applicants interacted with them for consultation to seek information regarding the jobs/vacancies, and interviews.

Figure 3: Officials whom the respondents had contact with in the district office




Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

4.3 Forms of corruption and maladministration

The majority (82.3%) of the respondents report bribery as their most known form of corruption. Weaver (2021) also reports corruption in the hiring process of government supervisors of community health workers (CHWs); where recruits paid bribes averaging 17 months' salary. Kristiansen and Ramli (2006), in an interview with 60 Indonesian civil servants, also report the payment of bribes in recruitment. According to IG, 2021⁶, bribery is among the main forms of corruption in the education sector, though not specifically in recruitment. In 2021, bribery alone cost the economy over UGX 39 billion in the education sector (IG, 2021).

⁶ IG, 2021, Cost and Extent of Corruption in the Education Sector in Uganda, https://www.igg.go.ug/media/files/publications/The_cost_and_extent_of_corruption_in_the_Education_Sector_in_Uganda_2_8pMy4nd.pdf

Figure 4: Forms of corruption and maladministration



Source: EPRC-IG survey, 2024

4.4 Extent of corruption

Table 6, provides estimates of the extent of corruption based on the proportion of respondents who were asked to pay bribes to be hired. The study disaggregates the results by region, sector, and gender. The Eastern region reported the highest number of respondents (35.9%) who were asked to pay a bribe to get hired. This was followed by the Western region (26.4%), the Central region (15.2%) and the Northern region (10.9%). By sector, agriculture reported the highest number of respondents who were asked to pay to get hired, followed by administration, community, health and education.

Table 6: Proportion of respondents who reported being asked to pay a bribe for recruitment (in the past 5 years)

Sector	Region			
	Central	Eastern	Western	North
Administration	13.2	35.9	26.3	7.4
Agriculture	18.9	45.8	21.4	15.0
Community	15.6	45.5	0	20.0
Education	20.0	27.6	17.7	4.6
Health	8.3	31.6	21.4	15.9
Other (please specify)		42.1	32.9	
By Gender				
Female	17.6	34.1	24.2	11.1
Male	12.1	37.2	31.9	10.8
Total	15.2	35.9	26.4	10.9

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Table 7 presents results of the proportion of respondents who were asked and actually paid the bribe by region, sector and gender. The Eastern region had the highest proportion of applicants who were asked and actually paid. The Western region followed, reporting 23.9% and finally the Central region, reporting 15.9%. In the study, it was discovered that the administration and education sectors have the highest proportion of respondents who actually paid the bribe request. In the Northern region none of the applicants who were asked bribes reported actually paying a bribe.

Table 7: Proportion of respondents who were asked for a bribe that actually paid

Category	Region			
	Central	Eastern	Western	Northern
Administrative	40.0	73.7	85.7	0
Agriculture Sector	27.3	53.9	33.3	0
Community Workers	50.0	60.0	0	0
Education Sector	55.6	55.6	40.0	0
Health Workers	25.0	51.8	60.0	0
Other (please specify)		66.7	32.0	0
By Gender				
Female	45.5	57.6	52.9	0
Male	30.8	61.8	38.7	0
Total	15.9	60.2	23.9	0

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

4.5 Cost of corruption

This section presents findings on the cost of corruption disaggregated by amounts asked, amounts asked and actually paid, sector, region and gender. The overall cost of corruption is a summation of the product of individual value of bribes reported and the corresponding weights.

Table 8 presents findings of the amounts asked by district officials disaggregated by sector, region and gender. The total amount that was asked from applicants as a bribe was UGX 78.7 billion. By sector and region, applicants in the education sector in the Western region were asked the highest amount of bribes, estimated at UGX 36.9 billion and, UGX 29.3 billion respectively. By gender, the male applicants were asked the highest amount, estimated at UGX 64 billion. None of the respondents in Northern Uganda reported being asked for a bribe.

Table 8: Amount asked from applicants

Sector	Region				Total	Percentage
	Central	Eastern	Western	North		
Administration	4,720,000,000	2,600,000,000	3,760,000,000	-	11,080,000,000	14.1
Agriculture	437,000,000	2,150,000,000	156,000,000	-	2,743,000,000	3.5
Community	404,000,000	2,030,000,000	-	-	2,434,000,000	3.1
Education	4,810,000,000	2,820,000,000	29,300,000,000		36,930,000,000	46.9
Health	9,700,000,000	2,020,000,000	2,550,000,000	-	14,270,000,000	18.1
Other	-	7,680,000,000	3,640,000,000	-	11,320,000,000	14.4
By Gender						
Female	5,540,000,000	5,900,000,000	3,350,000,000	-	14,790,000,000	18.8
Male	14,500,000,000	13,400,000,000	36,100,000,000	-	64,000,000,000	81.2
Total	20,040,000,000	19,300,000,000	39,450,000,000	-	78,790,000,000	
	25.4	24.5	50.1			100

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Table 9 presents the amount that was actually paid by applicants disaggregated by sector, region and gender. The total amount that applicants actually paid as a bribe was UGX 29.1 billion. By region and sector, applicants in the Central and those in the health sector paid the highest amount of bribes, estimated at UGX 14.0 billion and UGX 12.9 billion, respectively. By gender, the male applicants paid the highest amount, estimated at UGX 22.2 billion.

Table 9: Amount actually paid by applicants

Sector	Region				Total	%
	Central	Eastern	Western	North		
Administration	2,880,000,000	1,940,000,000	3,760,000,000	-	8,580,000,000	29.4
Agriculture	69,700,000	133,000,000	156,000,000	11,600,000	358,700,000	1.2
Community	91400000	1490000000	-	-	1,581,400,000	5.4
Education	1,280,000,000	494,000,000	-	-	1,774,000,000	6.1
Health	9,700,000,000	624,000,000	2,550,000,000	9,817,778	12,874,000,000	13.5
Other	-	323,000,000	3,620,000,000	-	3,943,000,000	13.5
By Gender						
Female	3,140,000,000	1,510,000,000	2,270,000,000	9,817,778	6,920,000,000	23.7
Male	10,900,000,000	3,500,000,000	7,820,000,000	11,600,000	22,220,000,000	76.3
Total	14,040,000,000	5,010,000,000	10,090,000,000	21,417,778	29,140,000,000	
	48.2	17.2	34.6	0.1		100


Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Figure 5 presents the source of funds that applicants used to pay for bribes. Majority of the applicants paid bribes from their personal savings (42.3%), followed by loans from friends (17.3%), sale of assets (13.5%), loans from the bank (13.5%) and salary (7.7%). Regarding salary, a KII reported:

One has to surrender the salary for a whole year pay in order to secure a job. (KII Respondent, 2024).

These particular results mirror the findings of Weaver, (2021) who reported that applicants have to pay bribes equivalent to 17 months of their salary.

Figure 5: Source of the money paid



Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Regarding the cost of corruption in terms of service delivery, key informants revealed that;

Corruption affects service delivery in several ways; people recruited based on corruption, definitely can never perform. Fine, that is one area. Two, such people can never be supervised. Yeah, we have them. We have them and we know them. It is very hard to supervise them because they know they have their godfathers. And in areas like maybe health, if you take such a person who is not qualified, it can actually lead to death. Yeah, death of patients. In the administration, we have had incidences of people stealing relief food, money from local people, you see. Those things are done by those ones who are actually taken there on the basis of who knows who. (KII Respondent, 2024)

The survey also inquired whether respondents paid a non-monetary bribe. However, very few respondents reported using this method of inducement. Indeed, one respondent who reported using sex was unsuccessful as indicated:

I was asked for UGX 12 million, but only managed to pay UGX 4 million and sex on top of that, however, I did not get the job. (KII Respondent, 2024)

4.6 Situations that facilitate corruption in recruitment

Corruption and maladministration within the DSCs pose significant threats to the integrity, efficiency, and fairness in LG recruitment processes. These issues not only compromise the quality of employees and service delivery, but also erode public trust in government institutions. Addressing the underlying factors that facilitate such unethical behaviour is crucial for developing effective strategies to combat these challenges. This subsection therefore presents the various situations identified as facilitators to corruption in recruitment at DSCs.

4.6.1. High rate of unemployment

The high unemployment rate in the country has led to high levels of desperation and competition for jobs. For instance, about 800,000 young people join the labour market in Uganda annually. However, the government and private sector can only employ about 100,000, leaving the majority 700,000 unemployed. This situation creates high competition for a few available jobs and candidates are willing to do anything including paying bribes to get hired.

On the one hand, reports from the KIIs indicate that the high unemployment rate in the country, particularly among the youth, renders them vulnerable to corrupt officials or middlemen, who simply want to take advantage of them.

A KII revealed that;

There are so many youths that are unemployed in this district, some cannot even afford a meal a day. This makes them vulnerable to conmen who want to fleece them of their money. The conmen even go ahead to run fake adverts and fleece them. In addition to the high unemployment rate, the DSC produces a shortlist of 200 applicants for two vacancies. This ratio is unrealistic, at least 10 or 20 applicants can be shortlisted, not 200. The conman can call each of them, asking for a minimum of UGX 100,000 as a bribe. This, to a greater extent, facilitates corruption. (KII respondent, 2024)

On the other hand, the applicants themselves, due to the high unemployment rate and

desperation, go to all extents to see to it that they get these jobs. They also do not believe they can get the jobs without paying a bribe or engaging the DSC members in other forms of corruption.

KIIs revealed that;

The applicants are desperate and can do anything to get a job; some of them voluntarily go an extra mile and sell their own pieces of land to pay a bribe that will enable them secure a job. Others succumb to pressure from society and parents and are willing to do anything including offering sex in return for a job. (KII respondent, 2024)

Corruption is very much alive and rampant in the recruitment process; and this is because jobs are few. For example, for a position of Education Assistant that was recently advertised, only 45 positions were available, but the district received over 1000 applications. Only 290 were shortlisted and 45 individuals were finally selected. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.6.2. Nature of appointment of the DSC Members

The Local Government Act, Section 54(2) stipulates that the DSC shall consist of the Chairperson and Members who shall be nominated by the District Executive Council (DEC), approved by the District Council and the Public Service Commission (PSC) and appointed by the District Chairperson. For this reason, the Commission is not independent as required by law, because of influence peddling and political interference from the local interests. Findings from the KIIs revealed that this lack of independence is a great hinderance to transparency and integrity in the work of DSCs. Several DSC members, especially the Chairperson will always, in response to being appointed, act in the interest of the LC V Chairperson and the DEC.

A KII revealed that;

Most of the requests of the LC V Chairperson to the DSC members regarding recruitment are adhered to or honored. Failure to do so renders a member at risk of missing out on re-appointment in the next cycle. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.6.3 Political interference/patronage

Political interference poses a significant threat to recruitment integrity within the DSC. The integrity in recruitment has been compromised by localisation of jobs which contravenes the LG and PSC Acts which highlight the fact that LG and PS jobs are open to all qualifying Ugandans. External pressures from local political figures to hire specific candidates undermine merit-based recruitment processes. Safeguarding the DSC's independence from political influence is essential to upholding recruitment integrity and ensuring fair practices. The evidence of patronage is emphasised by Figure 4, which reveals that it is ranked third among the common forms of corruption. Insights from KIIs highlight the challenges posed by political pressure and the need to protect the DSC from such influences.

Jobs in this district are for children of this district only, those not from this district are advised to try seeking employment in their home districts. In retaliation, another key political figure from an adjacent district, during an interview, asked candidates not from his district to exit the interview. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.6.4 Inadequate funding and financial resources for DSC.

Most of the DSC members in the 20 LG districts visited complained about inadequate funding of the Commissions which inhibits smooth operation.

The majority of the DSCs visited don't have adequate funding for their operations. Moreover, the limited funding of UGX 18 million received from the central government is sometimes encroached on by the Local Council for their operations which undermines DSCs operations and necessities ring-fencing and increasing the budget. KIIs revealed that;

This funding is inadequate to facilitate the Commissions in recruitment or performance of their activities such as advertising. A lack of adequate funding leads to shortcuts and compromises integrity in recruitment. Sometimes the DSC do not have money to run adverts in newspapers, thus, rely on well-wishers, or resort to noticeboard for advertising which compromises the integrity of the recruitment process. (KII respondent, 2024)

The retainer fees paid to some Commission members are too low and is some time paid late.

Among the DSC representatives, it is only the Chairperson that gets a monthly salary of about UGX 1.2 million while the rest of the DSC members only receive a sitting allowance and monthly retainer ranging from as low as UGX 30,000. These fees are very low, are paid late and are, in most cases, in arrears. Hence, for the DSC to compensate themselves they resort to soliciting bribes from applicants thereby compromising their integrity. (KII respondent, 2024).

4.6.5 Lack of transparency

One of the primary facilitators of corruption in recruitment processes is a lack of transparency. When criteria, procedures, and decisions are opaque, it becomes easier for the DSC to manipulate outcomes for personal gain. These include hidden criteria for choosing candidates, and undocumented decisions regarding appointment. KIIs reported that;


An applicant was denied a job because he was speaking good English even after performing exceptionally well because they thought such good English could not fit in the local set up. (KII respondent, 2024).

Like in promotions now in Local Government, you cannot be promoted without paying money. It is not easy to get promoted until you have given money but now even the people who get promoted, they cannot tell you because that is an arrangement between him and the Commission. In districts like Mbale, Iganga, Bugiri, Busia, unless you pay you can't get a promotion, even in promoting someone, teachers, even for confirmation. If you could go to one of them Mbale or Mayuge. (KII respondent, 2024).

In one of the Districts in the Northern region, the Commission did not follow the right procedures and guidelines regarding the minimum qualifications required for the position of Environmental Health Officer. Realizing that none of the candidates had met the minimum requirements after shortlisting, they called the candidates for the interviews but decided to raise the scores such that none of the candidates would qualify. However, one of the candidates who emerged the best though did not get the required pass mark decided to report the Commission to the IG and was given the job.

Figure 6 shows that 31.2 % of the respondents report that the bribe is most likely to be asked at the shortlisting stage, followed by 28.8 % who report that the bribe is most likely to be asked at the interview stage.

Figure 6: Stage at which a bribe is most likely to be asked




Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

According to figure 7 below, 32 % of applicants reported that it is the DSC members that are most likely to ask for a bribe during the recruitment process. This is mainly attributed to the low remuneration, exacerbated by the late payments, which force them to ask for bribes as reported by the majority of the key informants. In addition, other key informants reported that, it is only the DSC Chairperson who gets a monthly salary of about UGX 1.2 million, while the Commission members only get meager allowances of about UGX 200,000, which only happens when they have a sitting. This sitting, however, could come once in six months or a year.

Apart from the DSC members, applicants report that the next in line to ask for a bribe are the Secretaries of the DSC (14.5%) and the Chairperson DSC (10%). These findings corroborate with the disaggregated findings at regional level as shown in Figure 8. However, in some regions such as the West, the LCV Chairperson follows after the DSC member in the likelihood of asking for a bribe.

Figure 7: Officials most likely to ask for a bribe




Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

The fact remains that the DSC get money but it is relative, depending on how you appear before them. Especially the Secretary, who is a very crafty man. The Secretary to this Commission is the one that gets money from left, right and center. The DSC have never done things independently, apart from the Chairman of the DSC. He's an elderly man, and he does things faithfully. (KII respondent, 2024)

The only challenge with the Law is that it has made the LCV Chairman directly responsible for appointing the DSC Chairperson. So, how do I operate without your influence if you have appointed me? I had promised I would arrest the LCV Chairman if all goes well, or if I get anybody giving me all the evidence and is ready to testify about how much money they paid to him. (KII respondent, 2024)

Figure 7 provides a regional disaggregation of the officials who are most likely to ask for a bribe. It is evident that the DSC Members are the most likely to ask for a bribe from applicants in all regions. This is closely followed by the Secretary to the Commission in three regions.


Figure 8: District officials most likely to ask for a bribe by region



Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Findings in Figure 9 reveal that bribes are mostly asked from applicants seeking positions in the health and administration sectors. This mirrors Weaver (2021) who reports corruption in the hiring process of jobs for government supervisors of Community Health Workers (CHWs); where, recruits paid bribes averaging 17 months' salary.

Figure 9: Sector Vs. bribe asked




Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

4.6.6 Weak oversight and accountability

Weak oversight mechanisms and limited accountability significantly enables corrupt practices. Without regular supervision, adequate monitoring and frequent audits or spot checks, detecting and deterring corruption in recruitment becomes challenging. Moreover, the absence of consequences for corrupt actions can encourage individuals to engage in such behavior. Findings reveal that respondents are generally aware of whom to report their complaints to, with majority (66.8%) of the respondents identifying the IG as the authority to whom to report to, 51.6% of the respondents reported to the Police, 23.1% of the respondents reported to the State House Anti-Corruption Unit, 16.9% of the respondents reported to the RDC, and 12.0% to the CAO as shown in Figure 10. This implies that the presence of the IG offices in districts plays a part in controlling corruption. However, most KIs reveal that their cases have either never been resolved, there is consistently delayed feedback in all cases while other respondents reveal that cases cannot go any further without payments being made, especially to the Police.

I don't get formal feedback when I forward cases to IG, I have never got any success story from the cases I forward to the regional offices of IG. (KI respondent, 2024)

Figure 10: Awareness about the authorities to report to and whom cases were reported to



Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024


Despite applicants’ awareness on the authorities whom to report to, majority (63.3%) of the respondents revealed that they had never been in a situation where they needed to report. Among the reasons cited for non-reporting is lack of trust in the reporting system, fear of retaliation, bureaucratic reporting procedures, ignorance about reporting procedures, inadequate whistleblower protection as shown in Figure 11 below. The other reason for the large proportion of non-reporting among applicants is attributed to the fact that they are beneficiaries themselves who had to pay to get the job.

Inadequate whistleblower protection could be one of the reasons why people do not report. (KII respondent, 2024)

When one reports to the officials at the IG regional offices, they are willing to accept money to reveal the person who reported to them. (KII respondent, 2024)

We have a District Grievance Committee where complaints are supposed to be reported, however, the people that sit on that committee are the ones we are supposed to report, so they end up not reporting. (KII respondent, 2024)

Figure 11: Reasons for non-reporting



Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

4.6.7 Inadequate whistleblower protections

Fear of retaliation and inadequate protections discourage whistleblowers from reporting corrupt activities. Establishing robust whistleblower protection mechanisms, including anonymity and protection from retaliation, is crucial to encouraging the reporting of unethical behavior. Insights from a certain DEO and Chairperson DSC underscore the fear of consequences and underreporting of corrupt practices within the DSC.

4.6.8 Nepotism and favoritism

Nepotism and favoritism undermine meritocracy and integrity in recruitment. When decisions are influenced by personal relationships rather than competence and qualifications, the recruitment process loses its fairness.

Some candidates have prior knowledge of interview questions and political pressure to appoint relatives, which are clear indicators of nepotism and favouritism. There is always pressure from the council for us to appoint from within their district. (KII respondent, 2024).

4.6.9 Inadequate training and professional development

Insufficient induction and training of DSC members on ethical standards and best recruitment practices can inadvertently lead to maladministration. When employees are unaware of Anti-Corruption Policies, they are more susceptible to engaging in or overlooking corrupt practices. Providing comprehensive training programs that emphasize ethical behaviour and minimize undue influence from high-ranking officials is crucial.

There is a need to induct the DSC members on the ethical and best practices in recruitment to remind them of the professionalism required as they execute their mandate. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.6.10 Inconsistent policies and procedures

Ambiguous or contradictory recruitment guidelines create loopholes that corrupt individuals can exploit.

Someone who speaks good English was denied a job even after emerging as the best, citing that their English could not fit the rural setup. (KII respondent, 2024)

Establishing clear, consistent policies and ensuring their uniform enforcement can mitigate these risks. Despite challenges such as gaps between the application and interviewing phases, measures like implementing online applications and providing immediate feedback after interviews can help prevent corrupt practices, as noted by DEO.

4.6.11 Cultural and Social Factors

The findings reveal that corruption in recruitment has been normalized and adherence to standards has diminished. Societal expectations and pressures to provide jobs for certain groups leads to corrupt recruitment practices. Key informants highlighted that;

Corruption is as old as humankind; it is in our blood and in genes. (KII respondent, 2024)

People lost values (or can I call it integrity) and this is two-way. Because, even for the Commissioners, since it is a contract kind of work, someone will sit and say, how will I benefit? So, he starts swindling as if it is a supermarket. So, there is need to work on our values so that people can be patriotic. (KII respondent, 2024)

We lost values and I do not know what will happen in the next maybe 20 years to come Some people see corruption as part of life, the way their fathers, their mothers, their guardians are getting money, is in a queer way and they take it to be normal.It is until we restore the values, that is when we can fight corruption. Let's use cultural leaders. Let's use religious leaders to make sure that we restore integrity (KII respondent, 2024)


4.6.12 Direct contact with applicants through telephone calls

The phone calls that DSC officials make to the applicants, to a greater extent, initiate corruption. A phone call is very personal and gives the DSC official a platform to directly pick the mind of the applicant on the ability or willingness to pay a bribe. A respondent stated that:

Applications for vacancies should be made online and communicated to the applicants pinned on the noticeboard or via email. These two modes of communication act as a deterrent to officials seeking bribes. (KII respondent, 2024)

Figure 12 below shows that 26.3% of the applicants were contacted by phone call and 21.4% were contacted via text message. There is a need to move away from phone calls

Figure 12: How the applicants were contacted



Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Using phone calls and text messages to notify candidates increases the likelihood of being asked for a bribe because of the personal contact. For the case of phone calls, this could be attributed to the direct contact that it gives to two parties. Regarding the use of notice boards, it was reported that, in some of the districts, the shortlists used to be pinned with contacts of the candidates and conmen took advantage of them to solicit for bribes.

4.6.13 Manual-based recruitment processes

Most of the recruitments in Local Governments are manual in nature with a lot of human interface and paper. The manual processes have a high risk of alteration. There is evidence of alteration of DSC Minutes and shortlists to favor certain candidates. Reducing human interface is core in reducing corruption in all recruitment processes.

4.7 Challenges to effective operations of the District Service Commissions

The DSC serves as a critical entity responsible for the recruitment of public service personnel at the district level. Its effectiveness is paramount to upholding transparency, fairness, and efficiency in public service recruitment processes, thereby influencing the quality of governance and service delivery. However, several persistent shortcomings impede the DSC's ability to operate effectively, spanning structural, procedural, and contextual dimensions.

4.7.1 Structural shortcomings

A significant structural challenge confronting the DSC is the inadequate allocation of resources. Financial constraints often restrict the Commission's capacity to fulfill its mandates effectively. Insufficient funding limits the Commission's ability to hire adequate staff, invest in essential infrastructure, and implement necessary training programs. This limitation extends to technological resources, essential for modernizing recruitment processes and administrative functions, but often inaccessible due to budgetary limitations.

For instance, a certain secretary of DSC highlighted that;

The financial constraints are severely hampering our ability to perform our duties efficiently. This was emphasized by another Chairperson DSC that the Commission receives only 18 million and is not enclosed; it is always encroached. (KII respondent, 2024)

Furthermore, understaffing worsens operational inefficiencies within the DSC. The shortage of personnel not only burdens existing staff with excessive workloads but also compromises the quality and timeliness of service delivery. Insufficient staffing levels hinder the Commission's ability to conduct thorough candidate assessments and maintain rigorous oversight over recruitment processes. Another Secretary of the DSC also noted that;

Our staff is overwhelmed with the current workload, which affects the overall efficiency of the Commission. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.7.2 Procedural shortcomings

Transparency and accountability are foundational to the legitimacy of public service recruitment. Yet, opaque procedures and inconsistent application of rules undermine trust in the DSC's operations. Non-transparent decision-making processes can lead to perceptions of favoritism and bias, eroding public confidence in the integrity of e-recruitment. A certain CAO revealed that;

There is need to adhere strictly to guidelines for appeals and feedback to maintain transparency. (KII respondent, 2024)

Weak oversight mechanisms further worsen these procedural challenges. Inadequate monitoring and infrequent audits create loopholes for corrupt practices to thrive unchecked. Strengthening oversight bodies and enforcing stringent penalties for malpractice are crucial steps towards enhancing accountability within the DSC.

Complex bureaucratic procedures also impede operational efficiency. Excessive administrative red tape not only delays recruitment processes but also frustrates both applicants and staff. Simplifying bureaucratic procedures and streamlining administrative workflows could significantly enhance the Commission's efficiency and responsiveness.

4.7.3 Contextual shortcomings

Political interference poses a formidable challenge to the independence and impartiality of the DSC. External pressures from political figures to influence hiring decisions undermine merit-based recruitment principles. Such interference compromises the Commission's ability to select candidates based solely on qualifications and merit, potentially resulting in the appointment of unqualified individuals.

Cultural and societal factors further complicate efforts to maintain integrity within the DSC. In environments where corruption is endemic and socially normalized, cultural pressures to prioritize personal connections over qualifications can distort recruitment processes. A certain Chairperson LC V noted that;

Corruption is normal, we just have to learn how to live with it. (KII respondent, 2024)

Promoting a culture of ethical conduct and integrity through public awareness campaigns and community engagement is essential to combating these ingrained practices.

Economic factors also play a significant role in perpetuating corrupt practices within the DSC. Low salaries and economic hardships among Commission staff increase susceptibility to bribery and other unethical inducements. Addressing these economic challenges through fair compensation and supportive measures can mitigate the financial pressures that contribute to corrupt behaviour.

4.7.4 Other shortcomings in recruitment practices

The standardization of recruitment criteria remains a critical issue. Inconsistent application of assessment tools and criteria for selection of candidates can lead to subjective decision-making and biases in candidate selection. Establishing clear, standardised guidelines for recruitment, including robust background checks and performance assessments, is essential to ensuring fairness and transparency in the selection process. The Secretary of DSC, Wakiso, mentioned that;

There is no strict adherence to guidelines, rules can be changed in the house, and the decision of the Commission is unquestionable. (KII respondent, 2024)

Thorough background checks are pivotal in verifying candidates' qualifications and ethical standards. Insufficient vetting procedures increase the risk of appointing individuals with questionable credentials or ethical lapses, compromising the integrity of the DSC's recruitment outcomes. A certain DEO stated that;

Thorough vetting to ensure that only the most qualified and ethical candidates are selected is needed. (KII respondent, 2024)

4.7.5 Constitution and operation of the District Service Commission

The Local Government Act provides for the establishment of the DSC which should be 5 members to be fully operational.


As shown in Figure 13, the Chairpersons and Members of the DSC are nominated by the District Executive Committee, approved by the District Council and forwarded to CAO for submission to the PSC for further vetting and approval. Upon approval, the nominees are sent back to the CAO who sends them to the Chairperson LCV for final appointment on behalf of the DEC. This process compromises the independence of the DSC.

The DSC pays allegiance to LCV who is the appointing authority. (KII respondent, 2024)

The DSC has stopped serving public interest and serves the interest of the LCV and DEC. (KII respondent, 2024)

It can be concluded that due to influence peddling and political interference from local political interests the independence of DSC has been compromised.

Figure 13: The appointment process for DSC members



Source: EPRC-IG illustration

The way the DSCs are currently appointed is political. They are nominated by the DEC, approved by the District Council and forwarded to PSC for further vetting and appointed by the LCV Chairperson. This makes them less independent and impartial in the execution of their duties. The public is concerned that the DSCs have stopped serving the public interest and only serve the interests of the DEC and LC V Chairperson.

Appointment of DSCs members by local politicians gives them political capital which they use to reward their supporters, and any attempt to remove or weaken this political capital tends to be resisted by local politicians.

The Local Government Act provides that the Commission should be composed of five members, a third of which should be women, one representative of urban authorities, one for persons with disability. This composition locks out many other able people. For instance, by default, the number was rounded off to two. When a person with a disability becomes a Chairman of the Commission, he or she “ceases” to be a disabled person, and in some districts, the pool of disabled persons is limited which affects the composition of the Commission from being fully constituted. In some districts, there are no urban authorities, and some other districts are purely urban.

4.7.6 Poor records management

Most of the records are kept in hard copies which makes it hard to retrieve. Also, records are not properly organized per position applied for. There is also shortage of space to keep the so many records in hard copies.

We have a small office that also acts as a store for all these files you see here, I have just come in this office so I can't retrieve some of the records of recruitment that happened before I came in...(KII respondent, 2024)

5.0 Policy Recommendations

5.1 Change the appointment procedure/process of the DSC officials

The Ministry of Local Government should initiate a review and amendment of the Local Government Act (Section 52, 54) to provide for DSC members to apply directly to PSC for appointment of potential DSC members who should be of proven integrity in public administration.

5.2. Change the composition of the DSC.

The Ministry of Local Government should initiate amendment of the LG Act to reflect meritocracy and ability in the composition of the Commission rather than representation based on disability, women and urban authorities.

5.3 Raise the minimum qualifications and experience of Members of the DSC

Section 56(1) [a]-[d] of the Local Government Act spells out the minimum qualifications for a member of the DSC: being ordinarily a resident of the district; with a minimum of ten years working experience in a responsible position; and being in possession of a diploma qualification and a person of high moral character and proven integrity. There are concerns that the minimum qualifications are too low. Thus, the Ministry of Local Government should initiate the amendment of the law to change the minimum requirement for one to serve as a member of the Commission.

It is proposed that a member of the Commission should have a minimum qualification of at least a Bachelor's degree and should have retired at the level of U3 and above in Public Service or as a director in the private sector. This will help to attract competent and qualified candidates to the Commission. For one to become a member of the Commission, one should be experienced in public administration.

The requirement that the member of the Service Commission should be a native of the district limits the attraction of qualified non-native members to the DSCs where natives do not qualify. The law should also be amended to remove the requirement that the member of the Service Commission should be a native of the district, especially where the district fails to attract or get a qualified natives.

5.4 Improve remuneration for DSC Members

The Ministry of Local Government should adequately facilitate DSC members to mitigate the temptation of bribery and undue influence. Fair remuneration attracts qualified individuals and promotes decisions based on merit rather than personal gain. The monthly retainer earned by members should at least be equivalent to graduate salary of entrant in Public Service. Furthermore, the MoLG should take over the payment of this retainer drawn from the consolidated fund.

5.5 Automation of the recruitment process

Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Local Government should fast-track and expedite the automation and implementation of e-recruitment at the local government through the Human Capital Management (HCM) and Public Service e-recruitment system. This should be implemented at all recruitment stages to minimize physical contact with the applicants.

The Public Service Commission E-recruitment system is one of the major tools used during the recruitment process developed in 2017 by a local contractor and operationalized in 2018. It is comprised of 3 major modules; The applicant's module, internal module and examinations module.

The internal module is used by internal staff to perform tasks like advert creation, report generation, view applications, shortlist candidates, advert and shortlist approvals and publishing, schedule interviews and generate orders of merit.

The applicant's module is the public facing component of the system that allows members of the public register accounts, complete their profiles with document uploads, view approved and published job adverts and shortlists, receive in-application notifications on status of applications and view any other notices and announcements from the PSC.

The examinations module is used to administer both aptitude and competence examination electronically and only accessible at designated examination centres and when an examination is in progress. Aptitude candidates are able to view their scores on submission reducing the possibilities of altering a candidate's results.

There is also a parallel Human Capital Management system (HCMs) used by the Ministry of Public Service. The HCM is customized for payroll management, compensation and retirement benefits. However, the Public Service E-recruitment is customized for recruitment and not payroll. Thus, there is need to integrate these two systems to enhance efficiency in the recruitment process. Refer to appendix for the structure.

5.6 Address influence-peddling by politicians and persons with local interests

The DSCs have been captured by special interest, especially by local politicians who have localized jobs. For instance, they argue that jobs in the district are for the sons and daughters of the district. This contravenes the public service rules which allow every qualified Ugandan to work anywhere. To make the Commission autonomous and independent, the Commissioners should directly apply to the PSC with a recommendation from their former employers. This could save the Commission from capture by local special interests.

5.7 Enhance transparency in recruitment processes

The Ministry of Public Service and PSC should initiate amendment put in place clear policies and procedures that ensure transparency at every stage of recruitment. This includes openly declaring vacancies, setting clear job qualification criteria, and documenting all decisions for public accessibility. Ensure strict adherence to standards.

5.8 Strengthen oversight mechanisms

All Anti-Corruption Agencies should strengthen and enhance coordination among themselves in monitoring, auditing and investigation of regularities in recruitment activities. The Agencies should investigate allegations of corruption and ensure strict compliance with established procedures in recruitment processes.

5.9 Increase funding allocated to DSC operations

Government should increase funding for inspection, monitoring and capacity building of Commission members. There is need for funding for induction of Commission members, continuous professional development, patriotism, etc.

5.10 Protection of Whistle-blower

All Anti-Corruption Agencies should establish robust mechanisms to protect whistle blowers who report corruption in recruitment processes. This will encourage transparency and accountability by ensuring whistle blowers feel safe and supported when reporting irregularities in recruitment.

5.11 Educational campaigns and training

The MoPS and MoLG in conjunction with PSC should conduct regular training sessions and public awareness campaigns on ethical recruitment practices, the consequences of corruption, and the importance of meritocracy in public service. Educational initiatives could help to promote ethical behaviour among DSC members and the broader public. Ensure continuous professional development (CPD) and induction by the Public Service Commission.

5.12 Heads of Department should be transferable

The occupants of some key positions in local government, especially for staff U3 and above, can be recruited locally but serve nationally through transfers to other district local governments either regionally or nationally, just like it's for the CAO or DCAO. When staff overstay in one place for a long time, they build local networks and accumulate too much power, become powerful and complacent, and learn to manipulate systems.

5.13 Establish a fully-staffed Secretariat to man the Commissions

As it stands, the Commissions are under-staffed, with only two permanent staff, the Secretary and Chairperson, which hinders the effective operations of Commission activities. The Government should establish a fully-staffed Secretariat to handle and coordinate day-to-day operations. The secretariat should have the minimum infrastructure required to run an office such as computer, printer, internet, cabinet, telephone, desk and chair/table, etc.

In addition, the secretariat should leverage the use of ICT to ensure that the systems of Government are integrated to enhance information sharing. For instance, institutions like Universities, NITAU, NIRA, and UNEB among others should be integrated to facilitate document verification in the recruitment process.

6.0 Conclusion

The study concluded that corruption is prevalent in recruitment by DSC with total bribes demanded from applicants amounting to UGX 78 billion and bribes paid by applicants amounting to UGX 29 billion. These bribes vary significantly by position applied for, level of seniority and sector. The bribes range from UGX 40 to 50 million for senior positions to UGX 3 million for lower-level jobs like Nursing Assistants and Grade III primary school Teachers.

The education sector reported the highest amount of bribes asked estimated at UGX 36.9 billion, followed by the health sector with about UGX 11 billion. However, the health workers paid the highest amount of bribes estimated at UGX 12.87 billion. The Central region paid the highest amount of bribes estimated at UGX 14 billion followed by the Western region where applicants actually paid UGX 10 billion.

It was also concluded that, most DSCs follow the recruitment process to a greater extent. However, there are irregularities and malpractices related to forgery of minutes, academic documents, impersonation, sneaking in people who did not apply for appointment, fake advertisements, localization of jobs, partial recruitment and advertisements.

Regarding the recruitment stages, it was established that applicants are most likely to pay bribes at the shortlisting stage and DSCs members are the most likely persons to ask for a bribe.

Most (44%) of the DSCs were not fully constituted which affected their operations.

7.0 Outline of Policy Recommendations

Issue	Recommendation
Influence peddling, political interference and patronage by special local political interests of (LCV Chairperson and LCV Councilors) in the appointment of Commissioners. This leads to local capture and a lack of independence of the Commission.	To realize the independence of the Commission, there is a need to amend the Local Government Act (section 54 (2)), which empowers the DEC, and District Chairperson to nominate and appoint the DSC. To safeguard the independence of the Commission, from local politicians, the Commissioners should directly apply to the PSC for vetting and appointment.
Incompetence of the Commissioners due to lack of experience as well as the inferiority of DSC members. Most of the Commissions visited have members with limited technical capacity and experience in public administration.	For one to become a member of the Commission, one should have experience in public administration and technical integrity. They should have retired at least at the level of U3 and above. Raise the minimum qualifications and experience required to become a member of the DSC.
Low minimum qualification for DSC members.	Amend the law to increase the minimum requirements and qualification for appointment to Service Commission. Commission members should have a minimum of at least a Bachelor's degree. Ensure Continuous Professional development (CPD) of Commissioners through induction and professional training.
Lack of basic awareness about the importance of meritocratic recruitment	Conduct regular training sessions and public awareness campaigns on ethical recruitment practices, the consequences of corruption, and the importance of meritocracy in public service. Undertake sensitization and awareness campaigns
Weak whistleblower protection prevents people from reporting due to fear of victimization.	Establish robust mechanisms for reporting corruption and protecting whistleblowers who report corruption in recruitment.

Issue	Recommendation
<p>Lack of transparency and accountability at different stages of recruitment</p>	<p>Automate hiring by introducing e-recruitment at local government. All applications, shortlisting and aptitudes should be made and outcomes communicated online to minimize physical contact with key district personnel.</p> <p>Where written interviews, tests/aptitudes are involved, all candidates should first sit for written or technical tests at once to minimize leakages and then proceed to orals.</p> <p>Outsourcing technical persons where there is a conflict of interest</p> <p>Ensure quality assurance during the recruitment process by involving responsible agencies, e.g., PSC, IG, OAG, PSC, Health Service Commission, Education Service Commission, and Statehouse Anti-Corruption Unit (SHACU) to monitor the process and outcomes.</p> <p>There is a need for regular monitoring and supervision of DSCs by PSC through spot checks.</p>
<p>Poor and untimely remuneration of DSC members leads to the temptation to ask for bribes.</p>	<p>Adequately compensate DSC members to mitigate the temptations of asking for bribery. The Commission members should be paid monthly just like it is for chairpersons.</p>
<p>Localization of jobs/ring fencing of jobs. Some jobs at the local government have been localized for the natives of the district and relatives of the district officials. It is only when they fail to attract local candidates that they open up for other qualified non-local candidates, which contravenes the public sector hiring rules.</p> <p>Also, overstay of staff in one place and location for a long time without transfers leads to complacency and the accumulation of local networks and power, as the staff learn to manipulate and beat the system.</p>	<p>Recruitment at local government should be national in character as provided for in the public service rules that all qualified Ugandans are free to work anywhere. The LG staff can be recruited locally but serve nationally through transfers and rotation. Recentralise the recruitment of some key district personnel especially for positions of U3 and above. The key district personnel can be recruited locally but serve nationally through transfers to other districts. Amend the law to provide/allow for the transfer of key personnel at the district across the country.</p>
<p>Inadequate funding of Commission activities. The Commission budget is very small, insufficient to support effective operation of the Commission activities. Moreover, the district council sometimes raids/encroaches on the small budget.</p>	<p>The central government should increase funding for the Commission.</p> <p>The Commission budget/vote should be ring-fenced to prevent encroachment by the council.</p>

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
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
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Appendix

Public Service E-recruitment process



Public Service Human Capital Management System (HCM)



Number of sampled applicants by application status and region

Region	Applied	Applied and not shortlisted	Shortlisted but not appointed	Appointed
Central	191(25.5%)	62	64	65
Eastern	225(30.1%)	61	89	75
Northern	167(22.1%)	49	57	59
Western	167(22.3%)	54	53	60
Total	748	226	263	259

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Proportions of sampled applicants by region and sector

Applicants	Education Sector	Administrative	Health Workers	Agriculture Sector	Community Workers	Others	Total
Applied and not shortlisted	23.58	30.11	28.16	36.21	32.84	30.61	29.99
Shortlisted but not appointed	38.68	34.09	38.51	31.03	29.85	33.67	34.87
Shortlisted and appointed	37.74	35.8	33.33	32.76	37.31	35.71	35.14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Number of applicants by application status and region

Region	Applied	Applied and not shortlisted	Shortlisted and not appointed	Appointed
Central	569,413	226,760	128,343	214,309
Eastern	34,906	9,450	15,783	9,672
Northern	11,784	3,230	3,937	4,616
Western	44,299	14,087	11,931	18,281
Total	660,401	253,528	159,995	246,878

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Proportion of District officials most likely to ask a bribe by application status

	Applied but not shortlisted	Shortlisted but not appointed	Appointed	Total
Don't Know	34.2	60	75.6	55.9
Member DSC	33.1	22.4	14	23.4
Secretary DSC	20.8	6.4	4.4	11.2
DHO	2.9	0.1	0.1	1.2
CAO	2.7	0.8	0.5	1.4
Support staff at the district (e.g. office attendants)	2.2	2.2	0.9	1.7
Chairperson DSC	1.9	5.3	1.9	2.7
LCV Chair	0.9	1.2	1	1
Personnel Officer	0.8	0	0.1	0.3
Other	0.5	1.1	1.1	0.9
RDC	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
DEO	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.3
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024

Proportions of District officials most likely to ask a bribe at different recruitment stages

	CAO	Chair DSC	Member DSC	DEO	DHO	Secretary DSC	Support staff (eg office attendant)	Other	Total
Shortlisting	37.5	71.4	53.9	-	50.0	36.4	25.0	25.0	44.3
Interview	37.5	42.9	43.6	-	50.0	54.6	25.0	25.0	40.9
Application	25.0	42.9	30.8	-	-	18.2	62.5	33.3	31.8
Appointment	12.5	-	23.1	-	-	36.4	12.5	16.7	19.3
Posting	-	-	-	-	-	9.1	-	8.3	2.3
Confirmation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.7	2.3
Others	-	-	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	1.1

Source: EPRC-IG survey 2024



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